EEOC ISSUES UPDATED COVID-19 VACCINATION GUIDANCE TO EMPLOYERS

 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has released updated and expanded technical assistance addressing frequently asked questions concerning COVID-19 vaccinations in the employment context, and what is permissible under federal equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”).

The key updates to the technical assistance are summarized below:

• Federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19, so long as employers comply with the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other EEO considerations. Other laws, not in EEOC’s jurisdiction, may place additional restrictions on employers.  From an EEO perspective, employers should keep in mind that because some individuals or demographic groups may face greater barriers to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination than others, some employees may be more likely to be negatively impacted by a vaccination requirement.
• Federal EEO laws do not prevent or limit employers from offering incentives to employees to voluntarily provide documentation or other confirmation of vaccination obtained from a third party (not the employer) in the community, such as a pharmacy, personal health care provider, or public clinic. If employers choose to obtain vaccination information from their employees, employers must keep vaccination information confidential pursuant to the ADA.
• Employers that are administering vaccines to their employees may offer incentives for employees to be vaccinated, as long as the incentives are not coercive. Because vaccinations require employees to answer pre-vaccination disability-related screening questions, a very large incentive could make employees feel pressured to disclose protected medical information.

The EEOC has also posted a new resource for job applicants and employees, explaining how federal employment discrimination laws protect workers during the pandemic.

POT ON THE BALLOT COULD PUT EMPLOYER POLICIES OUT OF JOINT AND INTO THE COURTROOM

As this contentious presidential campaign season draws to a close on November 3, 2020, voters in five states also will be casting their ballots on legalization of marijuana. Arizona, Montana, New Jersey and South Dakota will decide whether to approve recreational marijuana, and Mississippi voters will choose whether to approve medical marijuana.

 

 However a recent federal court case in Pennsylvania, demonstrates the pitfalls and legal liabilities that employers can face in a state where marijuana is legal. In Hudnell v. Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2020), a U.S. District Court allowed an employee fired for testing positive for marijuana to bring a lawsuit against her employer under Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”). 

 The plaintiff in the case, Donna Hudnell, was hired by Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals (“the Hospital”) as a security analyst in 2016. By 2018, she began experiencing severe back pain that limited her ability to work, walk and sleep. Recreational marijuana is illegal in Pennsylvania, but medical marijuana is legal under the state’s MMA. Patients prescribed medical marijuana are required to be certified by a physician and receive a medical marijuana card. Hudnell’s physician, who also worked at the Hospital, prescribed her medical marijuana to alleviate her back pain. However, her condition worsened and she was approved to work from home in May of 2019.

In October 2019, she asked to return to work and was required under the Hospital’s policies to take a drug test, because she had been out for more than 90 days. She gave the testing nurse copies of all her prescriptions, including her medical marijuana card. The nurse informed Hudnell that the card had expired in August. Hudnell responded she had renewed her card in August but her appointment with her physician for recertification was scheduled for five days later. Her physician at the Hospital re-certified her at that time.

However, the hospital subsequently terminated her under their drug testing policy, because at the time she was tested, and was positive for marijuana use, she did not have a valid and certified medical marijuana card. 

She subsequently sued the Hospital under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act, and also alleged a claim under Pennsylvania’s MMA. Written into the MMA is a provision that “[n]o employer may discharge, threaten, refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges solely on the basis of such employee’s status as an individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.” 

In regard to Hudnell’s MMA claim, the Hospital asked the court to dismiss the claim on the basis that the MMA did not explicitly provide a private cause of action allowing an employee to file a lawsuit. The Hospital also argued the statute did not apply to her because she did not have a valid medical marijuana card when tested.

 

In ruling against the Hospital and finding Hudnell had a right to sue under the MMA, the federal court determined that there was an implied right of action because, without one, the anti-discrimination provision would have no practical effect, and allowed Hudnell’s litigation against the Hospital to proceed.

The lesson for employers in states that legalize marijuana, is that the language of these statutes can vary widely as to the protections afforded to employees, and employers may have to adjust their policies to comply, including reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Employers may also need to reexamine their drug testing policies and also address safety and discipline issues in regard to employees being under the influence in the workplace.

FOURTH CIRCUIT RULES THAT SPREADING WORKPLACE RUMORS OF “SEX FOR PROMOTIONS” CAN CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT

“No other evil we know is faster than Rumor, thriving on speed and becoming stronger by running.”

     _ Virgil, The Aeneid

 

Back in 19 BC, the ancient Roman poet Virgil noted the destructive nature of rumors.  More recently, in 2019, a federal appeals court has held that rumors can be a potential basis for liability in employment law litigation.

          In a significant decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court and held that false workplace rumors that a female employee had been promoted for having sex with her boss could serve as the basis for sexual harassment and retaliation claims against an employer.  The case also serves as a warning to employers of the costs involved in not effectively addressing such situations.

          In Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc. (4^th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019), Evangeline Parker worked at her employer’s warehouse facility.  While she began as a low-level clerk, she was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant Operations Manager of the facility.  However, she subsequently learned that a jealous subordinate, whom she had been promoted over, and a higher ranking manager at the warehouse, were actively spreading rumors that her success was the result of her having a sexual relationship with another company official.  As alleged in the lawsuit she later filed, as the rumor spread, Parker “was treated with open resentment and disrespect” from many coworkers, including employees she was responsible for supervising. As she alleged, her “work environment became increasingly hostile.” 

          The manager who was spreading the rumor subsequently confronted Parker and blamed her for “bringing the situation to the workplace” and told her “he could  no longer recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor” and he “would not allow her to advance any further within the company.”  When Parker subsequently sought to talk to the manager about the situation, the lawsuit alleges the manager lost his temper and began screaming at her.  Parker subsequently filed a sexual harassment complaint against the manager and the subordinate with the company’s Human Resources Manager.  Following the complaint, the manager in question issued written warnings against Parker and she was fired as a result.

          Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), Parker filed a lawsuit alleging a hostile work environment claim based on discrimination because of her sex, as well as a retaliation claim.  However, in January 2018, the federal District court granted the employer’s Motion to Dismiss.  The District Court held she failed to state a sex discrimination claim because “the establishment and circulation of this rumor is not based upon her gender, but rather based upon her alleged conduct.”  She subsequently appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

          In reversing the District Court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the lower court was wrong in deciding that the workplace rumor was not based on Parker’s sex:

As alleged, the rumor was that Parker, a female subordinate, had sex with her male superior to obtain promotion, implying that Parker used her womanhood, rather than her merit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion. She plausibly invokes a deeply rooted perception — one that unfortunately still persists — that generally women, not men, use sex to achieve success. And with this double standard, women, but not men, are susceptible to being labelled as “sluts” or worse, prostitutes selling their bodies for gain.

 

In short, because “traditional negative stereotypes regarding the relationship between the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior stubbornly persist in our society,” and “these stereotypes may cause superiors and coworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men,” it is plausibly alleged that Parker suffered harassment because she was a woman.

 

 

In addition to reversing the lower court’s dismissal of Parker’s sex discrimination claim, the Fourth Circuit also reversed the dismissal of her retaliation claim, allowing both claims to proceed to a trial on the merits.

          The lesson from this case is that workplace gossip and rumors are not harmless and can result in potential liability to employers when they involve protected classes under Title VII or other anti-discrimination statutes.  Human Resources should take complaints about such rumors seriously and address them directly.



EEOC Experiences “Separation Anxiety” in Lawsuit Against CVS

          The details are still yet to be known, but word out of Chicago is that the EEOC has suffered a big defeat in their controversial lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy, over the drug store chain’s use of separation agreements.  Employers commonly use separation or severance agreements when the employment relationship ends. In exchange for some type of payment, the employee agrees to a general release of any potential claims he or she might have against the employer, and possibly other provisions, such as confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses.

As reported in my August 8, 2014 post “Mad Men: The EEOC Advertises its Aggressive Agenda”, earlier this year, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against CVS, claiming the drug store chain’s use of its standard separation agreement demonstrated a pattern and practice of CVS interfering with employees' Title VII in a way that “deters the filing of charges and interferes with employees' ability to communicate voluntarily with the EEOC.” 

The EEOC’s lawsuit was troubling for many in the business community, because employers nationwide commonly use the language being attacked in the CVS agreements. In the event the EEOC were to prevail, it could have result in chaos for many businesses, casting into doubt the validity of such standard severance agreements, and potentially allowing former employees to revive previously barred claims.  

On September 18, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge John Darrah verbally granted CVS’s motion to dismiss based on the EEOC’s failure to state a claim, and an opinion is expected shortly that will give the Court’s basis for dismissing the EEOC’s lawsuit.  CVS has announced it is pleased with the decision and the EEOC is withholding comment until it sees the Judge’s written opinion.

It is not surprising that the EEOC filed the lawsuit.  In its Strategic Enforcement Plan for 2013-2016, the EEOC had announced its intent to target employer policies it claimed discouraged or prohibited individuals from exercising their legal rights, including overly broad waivers or settlement provisions that prohibited filing EEOC charges or providing information in EEOC or other legal proceedings.

In its rush to file a “test” case, the EEOC might have made the error of simply picking the wrong defendant to go after, or not bothering to actually read the agreements in question.  When it filed its motion to dismiss, CVS noted that its separation agreements expressly allowed for employees to participate with and cooperate in any investigation by a government agency, including the EEOC. Specifically, CVS’s agreements expressly note that none of the provisions are:

“[I]ntended to or shall interfere with employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation,” provided of course that the employee waives her entitlement to monetary and other relief.

       The decision in the CVS case may not bode well for a similar lawsuit filed by the EEOC in the United States District Court of Colorado.  Some legal commentators have suggested that the EEOC may be trying to use this type litigation to impose new guidelines for such agreements, or perhaps as a prelude to more formalized regulation

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLC, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here. He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com

Employers who Solicit Facebook Friend “Snooping” Could Face Liability Under Federal Stored Communications Act

Facebook postings by employees have increasingly become a factor in employment discrimination lawsuits.  In some of my recent cases, employers were made aware of an employee’s threats of violence, workplace misconduct or other inappropriate actions when a co-worker, who also was a Facebook “friend”, brought the Facebook post to the employer’s attention.  Such posts can be powerful evidence in defending against a discrimination lawsuit and proving that any adverse employment action was for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

However, a recent ruling by a federal District Court in New Jersey strongly suggests that employers who actively solicit Facebook friends to disclose the postings of an employee could be in violation of the Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11.

The SCA provides that whoever "(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters or prevents the authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while in electronic storage in such a system" shall be liable for damages. The statute further provides that "[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . [to] access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public." In other words, the SCA covers: (1) electronic communications, (2) that were transmitted via an electronic communication service, (3) that are in electronic storage, and (4) that are not public.

In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp. , the plaintiff was a nurse who maintained a Facebook account and had approximately 300 Facebook friends. Plaintiff selected privacy settings for her account that limited access to her Facebook wall to only her Facebook friends. Plaintiff did not add any hospital managers as Facebook friends. However, Plaintiff added many of her coworkers as friends. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, a hospital paramedic who was one of her Facebook friends was taking screenshots of Plaintiff's Facebook wall and printing them or emailing them to Plaintiff’s manager.

The evidence in the case showed that the paramedic independently came up with the idea to provide Plaintiff's Facebook posts to the manager, who had never asked the paramedic for any information about Plaintiff and had never requested to be apprised of Plaintiff's Facebook activity.

Plaintiff was subsequently temporarily suspended when the hospital learned of her Facebook post where she criticized paramedics in Washington, D.C. for saving the life of a gunman involved in a fatal shooting.  The post read as follows:

 An 88 yr old sociopath white supremacist opened fire in the Wash D.C. Holocaust Museum this morning and killed an innocent guard (leaving children). Other guards opened fire. The 88 yr old was shot. He survived. I blame the DC paramedics. I want to say 2 things to the DC medics. 1. WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? and 2. This was your opportunity to really make a difference! WTF!!!! And to the other guards....go to target practice.

The plaintiff received a memo from the hospital explaining the reason for the suspension was the hospital’s concern that her Facebook comment reflected a "deliberate disregard for patient safety." In response, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). After reviewing the evidence, the NLRB found that the hospital did not violate the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB also found that there was no privacy violation because the post was sent, unsolicited, to hospital management.  The plaintiff subsequently filed suit in federal court, alleging the hospital violated her rights under the SCA.

In its ruling, the District Court held that that non-public Facebook wall posts are covered by the SCA, because: (1) Facebook wall posts are electronic communication, (2) they are transmitted via an electronic communication service, the Facebook wall posts are in electronic storage, and (4) Facebook wall posts that are configured to be private are, by definition, not accessible to the general public, and that the touchstone of the SCA is that it protects private information.

However, the District Court ruled that the hospital was not liable because one of the SCA’s exceptions applied, which exempted conduct authorized (1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service; [or] (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user." 18 U.S.C. §2701(c).

The Court held that exception applied because the plaintiff had authorized the paramedic to have access to her Facebook wall by making him a “friend” and that the information the paramedic supplied to hospital management was completely unsolicited.

The District Court implicitly held that if the hospital had directed the paramedic or any other of the plaintiff’s Facebook friends to monitor and keep them appraised on Plaintiff’s Facebook activity, it would have constituted a violation of the SCA due to the hospital seeking unauthorized access.  The SCA provides for civil liability under the statute and an employer would be subject to monetary damages.

While it may be tempting for employers to utilize the Internet to monitor employees’ conduct, the lesson from this case is that employers should never request that co-workers or any other individuals access an employee’s private social media.  As related in previous articles, employers also need to be aware that overly broad social media policies could expose them to potential liability under the National Labor Relations Act.

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here.  He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com.