Employment Non-Discrimination Act Nears Senate Vote and Related "Lagniappe"

In a  posting last month, I noted on the improved prospects for passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”), which would extend Title VII protection against employment discrimination to lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender employees (“LGBT”). The law would make sexual orientation/sexual identity a protected class in the same manner race, religion, gender, national origin, age and disability are protected under existing federal laws, and make it illegal for organizations with 15 or more employees to:

"[F]ail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity."

On Monday, October 28, 2013, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) announced that he would bring the legislation to a Senate vote within the coming weeks. The legislation has picked up support from two Republicans in the majority Democrat chamber. Passage in the Senate would be a symbolic first for the legislation, which has been unsuccessfully introduced in one form or another for decades. However, it is unlikely that bill will get much traction in the House of Representatives.

This is an issue where the private sector has quietly taken action without the help or hindrance of lawmakers in Washington. A significant majority of Fortune 500 companies have voluntarily put in place policies prohibiting discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation or sexual identity. Some states also have  passed similar legislation into law.

 

However, specific provisions of ENDA do raise concern among employers, on such issues as employer dress codes. The language of ENDA does not prohibit “reasonable dress or grooming standards” but would require employers to permit:

"[A]ny employee who has undergone gender transition prior to the time of employment, and any employee who has notified the employer that the employee has undergone or is undergoing gender transition after the time of employment, to adhere to the same dress or grooming standards as apply for the gender to which the employee has transitioned or is transitioning."

Employers also have expressed worries about ENDA interpretations that would require employers to allow access to restrooms or dressing/locker rooms to employees who are biologically one gender, but identify with another gender. With the potential for sexual harassment liability or privacy issues, some business owners believe, for example, that ENDA would force them to ignore the legitimate concerns of female employees about having to share a restroom of dressing room with a male employee who self-identifies as a woman.

Regardless of how ENDA fares in Congress, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is already trying to pursue some of the same goals of ENDA, within the existing structure of Title VII. As I’ve previously discussed, late last year, the EEOC released its Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”) for 2013 – 2016. Among the agency’s targeted goals was to provide LGBT coverage under Title VII sex discrimination, even though such protection is not contained within the actual statute. The SEP also addressed the agency’s intent to curtail employer’s use of criminal background checks when making employment decisions.

In a somewhat related story, on September 27, 2013, in an en banc ruling, a ten-judge majority of a bitterly divided sixteen-judge Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the EEOC could establish a same-sex harassment claim with evidence of gender stereotyping in the form of sexually charged taunting directed at a male employee by his male supervisor. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2013).

In 2007, the employee filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sexual harassment stemming from the conduct of his male supervisor, who oversaw an all-male workforce on an ironworker construction site. The supervisor purportedly was lewd and vulgar to the employee on a daily basis, including instances of exposing his genitals to the employee while urinating, simulating anal intercourse whenever the employee bent over, and using homophobic slurs to refer to the employee. Upon completion of the administrative process, the EEOC brought an enforcement action on the employee’s behalf and, following a three-day jury trial, obtained a $300,000 verdict in favor of the employee.

The employer appealed the verdict. Initially, a Fifth Circuit panel tossed out the trial verdict for the employee, finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the supervisor had discriminated against the employee because of his gender. The EEOC subsequently sought and obtained an en banc review. Upon review, the en banc majority disagreed with the panel’s decision to overturn the jury verdict.

Although same-sex harassment has been judicially recognized for over a decade, this decision links the concept of unlawful gender stereotyping directly to same-sex harassment and reminds employers that same-sex taunting can be actionable. Moreover, the court noted that there was no evidence that either the employee or supervisor were homosexual, nor was evidence presented that the conduct at issue was motivated by sexual desire. The court’s opinion cautions that notions of sexual harassment based solely on sexual desire or exclusively between members of the opposite sex are misplaced and can increase risks for employers who are not aware that the prohibitions can be broader.

Employers should review their anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies in light of this opinion, and stay tuned for further developments in this area.

* Lagniappe: An extra or unexpected gift or benefit, i.e. “a little something extra”. (Chiefly Southern Louisiana & Mississippi).

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here. He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijman@phelps.com

 

“You’ve Got (Mass) Mail”…From the EEOC?

In an ironic reversal of roles, on Monday October 21, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) asked a federal District Court in the District of Columbia to dismiss a lawsuit filed against the agency by an aggrieved employer. The lawsuit alleges the EEOC unconstitutionally solicited or “trolled” the company’s employees to become class members in a potential age discrimination class action. (Case New Holland, Inc. and CNH America LLC v. EEOC et al., Civil Action No. 1:13cv1176).

The suit claims the EEOC violated the law by sending a mass e-mail, utilizing the company’s business e-mail domains, to over 1300 management and non-management employees, requesting the employees complete a survey and supply evidence of discrimination against the employer.

For employers more familiar with the typical EEOC procedures associated with a Charge of Discrimination, the mass e-mailing and request for information, without any notice to the company, raises some serious red flags.

The facts of the case are as follows. In March 2011, the EEOC notified CNH America, LLC (“CNH”) that it was launching a nation-wide review of the company for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The company employs approximately 10,000 people in the United States. The EEOC made a sweeping request for information and documents.

According to the lawsuit, in January 2012, the company produced to the EEOC 300 documents totaling 5,707 pages and over 600,000 electronic records from CNH databases, totaling 66,630 pages of documents. After complying with the agency’s request, the company received no communications of any sort from the EEOC until June 5, 2013, eighteen months later.

At 8:00 a.m. on June 5, 2013, the EEOC conducted a mass e-mailing to the business e-mail addresses of 1330 CNH employees across the United States and Canada. Over 200 of the recipients were members of management. The e-mail stated the EEOC was conducting “a federal investigation” and making “an official inquiry” into allegations that CNH discriminated against job applicants and employees, and contained a link to an on-line series of questions. It also asked for the employee’s birth date, address and telephone number. The EEOC’s on-line survey instructed CNH employees to “Please complete and submit this electronic questionnaire as soon as possible.”

The e-mail had been sent without any advance notice to CNH and according to the lawsuit, the mass mailing disrupted CNH’s business operations at the start of the work day and communicated to employees they should cease their legitimate work duties and instead immediately respond to the agency’s questions. A significant concern was the company’s belief that the EEOC had deliberately cut the employer out of the investigatory process, and had solicited members of management, whose statements arguably could have bound the company.

CNH filed its lawsuit on August 1, 2013, alleging that the EEOC’s mass e-mailing: (1) was not authorized by any EEOC rule or regulation, (2) violated the federal Administrative Procedure Act, (3) constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (4) violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, and (5) violated the EEOC’s own compliance manual, which requires that an employer be allowed to have a spokesman or attorney present during an interview of management employees, and that advance notice be given. The suit claims the EEOC engages in bullying tactics to force companies into monetary settlements of questionable claims.

The lawsuit seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting the EEOC from soliciting CNH employees by e-mail, and additional injunctive relief to prevent the EEOC from utilizing any of the information obtained through the mass e-mailing. The lawsuit claims:

"The EEOC has never, before June 5, 2013, sent out emails through business email servers, without any prior notice to the respondent employer, in an attempt to unearth plaintiffs against the employer"

On October 21, 2013, after some extensions granted by the District Court, the EEOC responded with a Motion to Dismiss. While addressing CNH’s various claims, the EEOC’s primary argument was that the case should be dismissed because the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider CNH’s claims because it was not a “final agency action”, and that the EEOC’s actions were within the agency’s investigative authority. Additional briefing by the parties will take place before any ruling.

I am not going to try to “read the tea leaves” as to how the District Court will ultimately rule in this case, but a few things are worth noting. First, the EEOC has been less than successful lately when it comes to telling U.S. District Judges what their authority is in regard to the agency. You’ll recall in a recent posting, I discussed the EEOC’s recently stated position that the agency’s conciliation efforts with employers, or lack thereof, were not subject to review by the federal courts. As noted in my article, the EEOC subsequently received a severe slap-down by a U.S. District Judge in Texas. The EEOC also has recently found itself subject to significant monetary sanctions by federal courts for some of its investigatory and litigation tactics.

Second, this extremely aggressive approach by the EEOC should concern employers because it seems to be a deliberate effort to cut employers and their legal counsel out of the investigatory process. The EEOC has always had the investigatory right to interview non-management employees without an employer representative or attorney present. However, because a statement by a member of management could be considered a binding admission on the part of the company, an employer is entitled to have legal counsel present for such interviews. It’s very easy to envisage a manager being cowed by a very official and intimidating e-mail into providing information, unbeknownst to the employer.

Third, heavy handed tactics, such as the mass mailing to the CNH employees described in the Complaint, or other EEOC actions that have caught the attention of the federal courts and resulted in sanctions, could conceivably result in blowback for the agency. This might include congressional action to limit the EEOC’s authority.

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here. He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com

The EEOC’s Title VII Conciliation Duty Remains Fair Game for Judicial Review

I am going to apologize in advance for this “Employee with the Dragon Tattoo Employment Law Blog” posting, because I suspect it will likely contain more than your daily suggested requirement of “legal-ese”. However, the issue of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) duty to engage in conciliation before suing an employer seems to be developing into another ongoing showdown between the agency and the federal courts. It is also an important issue for employers.

What prompted this posting was an editorial in the Wall Street Journal entitled "Is the EEOC Above the Law?"  It addressed the EEOC’s recently stated position that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts with employers, or lack thereof, were not subject to review by the courts. As detailed in the editorial, the EEOC subsequently received a severe slap-down by a U.S. District Judge in Texas. It also got me thinking about a case I had a number of years ago where the question of “good faith conciliation” became a significant issue.

For non-lawyers (and other well-adjusted folks) “conciliation” is just a fancy word for trying to reach a settlement before an EEOC Investigation and determination evolves into an actual lawsuit brought by the agency.  It's an option many employers want to at least explore before having to engage in the costly defense of a discrimination suit brought by a government agency. 

When the EEOC makes a “reasonable cause” determination in the course of investigating a charge of discrimination, it triggers a mandatory responsibility under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) to engage in good faith conciliation efforts before filing a lawsuit. This responsibility is not supposed to be a mere formality that is satisfied by merely making a few telephone calls and then checking a box on an agency form. Conciliation, after all, serves important public interests by, among other things, guaranteeing administrative due process to the accused, protecting the public from unwarranted litigation expense, and conserving scarce administrative and judicial resources. It is for these reasons that federal courts uniformly recognize that the responsibility of good faith conciliation is so important that honoring it is a condition precedent to the EEOC filing a lawsuit.

Good faith conciliation efforts depend on the honest and straightforward communication of basic factual information. Common sense dictates that good faith conciliation efforts do not include “hiding the ball” by failing to communicate, or worse, withholding, basic factual information, since such tactics obviously deprive the accused of both the opportunity to respond to claims against it and the ability to understand the basis of any damages sought in settlement of those claims. Rather, good faith conciliation efforts can only occur when the EEOC “lays the cards on the table” by disclosing factual information sufficient to afford the accused with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the claims and damages at issue before the EEOC commits itself to litigation.

To satisfy the statutory requirement of good faith conciliation, the EEOC must: (1) outline to the employer the reasonable cause for its belief that the law has been violated; (2) offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer. If a court finds that the EEOC terminated conciliation prematurely or failed to conciliate in good faith, it may stay the action and compel the EEOC to conciliate or dismiss the lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) (the court may “in its discretion stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance”); see also EEOC v. Agro Dist., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Courts remain free to impose a stay for the EEOC to continue prematurely terminated negotiations, and where the EEOC fails to act in good faith, dismissal remains an appropriate sanction.”).

So what are some hallmarks of “bad faith” conciliation? Denying an employer’s reasonable request for a face-to-face meeting is a common and compelling factor in finding that the EEOC has failed to conciliate in good faith. See, e.g., EEOC v. Agro Dist., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Pacific Maritime Assoc., 188 F.R.D. 379, 380-381 (D. Or. 1999).

Another tactic found by the courts to be unreasonable and in bad faith is if the EEOC takes an “all-or-nothing” approach to settlement. See, e.g., Agro, 555 F.3d at 468 (“The EEOC's take-it-or-leave-it demand for more than $150,000 represents the coercive, ‘all-or-nothing approach’ previously condemned by this court…”); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (“As we have said before, such an ‘all or nothing’ approach on the part of a government agency, one of whose most essential functions is to attempt conciliation with the private party, will not do”).

Lastly, federal courts have held that the EEOC’s failure to explain its monetary demands is not reasonable and does not allow a defendant to properly respond. See, e.g., EEOC v. Golden Lender Fin. Group, No. 99 CIV. 8591 (JGK), 2000 WL 381426, at *5 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 13, 2000) (holding that the EEOC did not meet its statutory obligation to conciliate when it ended conciliation after the charged party sought additional information regarding the requested damages of certain alleged victims); EEOC v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 188 F.R.D. 379, 381 (D. Or. 1999) (ordering a stay for further conciliation where “meaningful conciliation efforts were thwarted” during conciliation after “[c]ounsel for [defendant] reasonably requested that the EEOC investigator explain his calculation of the monetary settlement offered”).

In the case I was involved in, my co-counsel and I were faced with all three of the tactics described above. We were representing an out-of-state company in a sexual harassment claim brought by a number of employees, and the particular out-of-state EEOC office had filed suit after very perfunctory and unproductive conciliation.  The client had responded promptly and correctly when it discovered the actions of a rogue supervisory employee, yet the EEOC was demanding an excessive "take-it-or-leave-it" monetary settlement, wildly disproportionate to actual damages in the case.

We responded by filing a motion with the court to stay litigation and compel good faith conciliation. In a well-reasoned opinion, the U.S. Magistrate assigned to the case ruled in our favor and ordered the EEOC back to the table.  While the case was not resolved at the "re-conciliation", it laid the groundwork for a later settlement of the case for a reasonable amount.

I think the ability of the federal courts to review the EEOC’s conciliation efforts is a valuable protection for employers, and without it, the statutory requirement of conciliation would become meaningless. In fairness and full disclosure, my overwhelming experience with the EEOC in this regard, especially the local office here in Jackson, Mississippi, has been positive and the people professional and upfront in conciliation negotiations. However, as shown by the many court opinions on the subject, bad faith conciliation occurs and the judiciary is a vital check to such abuse.

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here. He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com

Accessing Employee’s Personal E-Mails on Company-Issued Phone Exposes Employer to Liability Under Federal Stored Communications Act

Earlier this month, I posted an article on how employers could face liability under the federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) if they solicited Facebook “friends” to access an employee’s social media postings. 

According to a U.S. District Court in Ohio, employers also could face SCA liability for viewing an employee’s e-mails on a company-issued phone.

In Lazette v. Kulmatycki and Cellico Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 3:12-cv-2416 (JGC) (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2013), Sandi Lazette received a company-issued Blackberry from her employer, Verizon Wireless.  Lazette would send and receive business related e-mails on the device. She was told that she also could use the company-issued phone for personal e-mail so she linked the device to her personal G-mail account.

When she left the company in September 2010, she returned the company-issued phone to her supervisor, Chris Kulmatycki. She understood that Verizon would “recycle” the phone for use by another employee.  However, when Lazette returned the phone, she neglected to delete the access to her personal Gmail account.

Over the next 18 months, without Lazette’s knowledge or authorization, Kulmatycki accessed her G-mail and accessed approximately 48,000 of her e-mails, which included communications about her family, career, financials, health, and other personal matters.  Lazette subsequently filed suit against Verizon and her former supervisor under the SCA. 

The company sought to have the case dismissed on a number of grounds, including its argument that the supervisor’s access was “not” unauthorized because: (1) he used a company-owned Blackberry; (2) he did not access a “facility,” as the statute uses that term; and that (3) Lazette authorized Kulmatycki’s access because she had not expressly told him not to read her e-mails and that she implicitly consented to his access by not deleting her G-mail account. Not surprisingly, the District Court rejected Verizon’s argument:

Turning to the substance of defendants’ contentions, defendants, in effect, contend that plaintiff’s negligence left her e-mail door open for Kulmatycki to enter and roam around in for as long and as much as he desired . . . Whether viewed through the lens of negligence or even of implied consent, there is no merit to defendants’ attempt to shift the focus from Kulmatycki’s actions to plaintiff’s passive and ignorant failure to make certain that the blackberry could not access her future e-mail.

After the District Court denied Verizon and Kulmatycki’s motion to dismiss, the case settled in August 2013 before it went to trial.

In this particular case, it’s obvious that the supervisor’s actions were not authorized by Verizon and his stalker-like review of the plaintiff’s personal e-mails were not for any legitimate business purpose. 

Aside from the inherent creepiness and “ick factor” of the plaintiff’s former supervisor, this case highlights the need for employers to have very clear policies as to what level of privacy an employee can expect in their use of a company’s devices or when an employee uses a personal mobile device or computer on behalf of their employer. 

In years past, such policies would simply inform employees that they should have no expectation of privacy, and that the company device is the property of the employer and may be subject to monitoring.  However, with companies allowing more personal use of company devices or moving to the practice of “BYOD” or “bring Your Own Device” for use at work, the lines have gotten blurred.  As such, employers need to regularly review and update their handbook policies to address how technology is actually being utilized by employees.

In light of this case, a good internal practice would be for a company’s IT department to review all returned devices and ensure they are scrubbed of any personal information before being recycled to another employee.

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here. He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com.

EEOC Lawsuit Over Dreadlocks Sparks Criticism and Highlights Issues with Workplace Grooming Policies

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has filed suit against Catastrophe Management Solutions, a Mobile, Alabama based insurance claims company, alleging the company violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against an African-American job applicant on the basis of race because she wore dreadlocks. (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00476-CB-M) The lawsuit highlights the employment issues that can arise over workplace grooming policies, and also has sparked sharp criticism from the business community.

According to the EEOC's suit, after completing an online job application, Chastity Jones was among a group of applicants who were selected for a group interview on May 12, 2010. At the time of the interview, Jones, who is black, had blond hair that was dreaded in neat curls, or "curllocks." Catastrophe's human resources staff conducted the group interview and offered Jones a position as a customer service representative.

Later that day, the human resources staff met with Jones to discuss her training schedule. During that meeting, they realized that Jones's curled hair was in dreadlocks. The manager in charge told Jones that the company did not allow dreadlocks and that she would have to cut them off in order to obtain employment. Jones declined to cut her hair, and the manager immediately rescinded the job offer.

In the lawsuit, the EEOC argues that Catastrophe's ban on dreadlocks and the imposition of its grooming policy on Jones discriminates against African-Americans based on physical and/or cultural characteristics. Delner Franklin-Thomas, district director for the EEOC's Birmingham District Office, stated, "Generally, there are racial distinctions in the natural texture of black and non-black hair. The EEOC will not tolerate employment discrimination against African-American employees because they choose to wear and display the natural texture of their hair, manage and style their hair in a manner amenable to it, or manage and style their hair in a manner differently from non-blacks.

The lawsuit came under sharp criticism today in a Wall Street Journal editorial entitled "The EEOC's Bad Hair Day".  The editorial notes the EEOC has a habit of "challenging perfectly legal business practices" and "[s]o is it any wonder that the agency is now expanding resources to workplace dress codes." The editorial had much harsher words for the EEOC’s position:

Apparently Ms. Franklin-Thomas has never seen dreadlocked whites (like the Counting Crow's Adam Duritz) or Latinas (like Shakira). Catastrophe's policy is in fact racially neutral because it enjoins all employees, regardless of race, "to be dressed and groomed in a manner that projects a professional and businesslike image," including "hairstyle." The company determined that dreadlocks don't meet that standard, as is its right.

By leveling a complaint on Ms. Jones's behalf, the EEOC is perversely suggesting that black people shouldn't be held to the same standards as everyone else. The larger travesty of this case and other misbegotten EEOC crusades of late is that they take time and resources away from individuals with legitimate claims of employment discrimination. Banning dreadlocks doesn't qualify.

Lawsuits over grooming policies and dress codes are nothing new, but usually arise in the context of Title VII claims of religious discrimination. These occur when a workplace policy conflicts with a religious practice. Such practices might include the wearing of a beard by Muslim men, the wearing of a skullcap or yarmulke by Jewish men, the wearing of a veil or hijab by Muslim women or the wearing of a turban by male practitioners of Sikh faith. As noted in an earlier article, the wearing of certain tattoos can be considered a religious practice under Title VII. Typical conflicts are policies against facial hair, or wearing attire that interferes with safety equipment or procedures.

In the context of religion, Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or job applicant’s religious observances or practices unless it can demonstrate that doing so would constitute an undue hardship on the conduct of its business. The reasonableness of an employer’s attempt to accommodate is a factual determination, made on a case-by-case basis. Each case necessarily depends on its own facts and circumstances, and in a sense every case boils down to whether the employer has acted reasonably. When putting together employee handbooks for clients, I typically advise including a provision in the dress or grooming codes that provides for a request for religious accommodation.

However, in the lawsuit against Catastrophe, the EEOC is claiming that the insurance company’s policy that employees "be dressed and groomed in a manner that projects a professional and businesslike image," including "hairstyle" specifically discriminates against African-Americans on the basis of race. The aggressive position of the EEOC on this issue is a troubling development for employers, many of which likely have grooming and dress code policies very similar to the defendant in this case.

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here. He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com.

Employers who Solicit Facebook Friend “Snooping” Could Face Liability Under Federal Stored Communications Act

Facebook postings by employees have increasingly become a factor in employment discrimination lawsuits.  In some of my recent cases, employers were made aware of an employee’s threats of violence, workplace misconduct or other inappropriate actions when a co-worker, who also was a Facebook “friend”, brought the Facebook post to the employer’s attention.  Such posts can be powerful evidence in defending against a discrimination lawsuit and proving that any adverse employment action was for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

However, a recent ruling by a federal District Court in New Jersey strongly suggests that employers who actively solicit Facebook friends to disclose the postings of an employee could be in violation of the Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11.

The SCA provides that whoever "(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters or prevents the authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while in electronic storage in such a system" shall be liable for damages. The statute further provides that "[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . [to] access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public." In other words, the SCA covers: (1) electronic communications, (2) that were transmitted via an electronic communication service, (3) that are in electronic storage, and (4) that are not public.

In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp. , the plaintiff was a nurse who maintained a Facebook account and had approximately 300 Facebook friends. Plaintiff selected privacy settings for her account that limited access to her Facebook wall to only her Facebook friends. Plaintiff did not add any hospital managers as Facebook friends. However, Plaintiff added many of her coworkers as friends. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, a hospital paramedic who was one of her Facebook friends was taking screenshots of Plaintiff's Facebook wall and printing them or emailing them to Plaintiff’s manager.

The evidence in the case showed that the paramedic independently came up with the idea to provide Plaintiff's Facebook posts to the manager, who had never asked the paramedic for any information about Plaintiff and had never requested to be apprised of Plaintiff's Facebook activity.

Plaintiff was subsequently temporarily suspended when the hospital learned of her Facebook post where she criticized paramedics in Washington, D.C. for saving the life of a gunman involved in a fatal shooting.  The post read as follows:

 An 88 yr old sociopath white supremacist opened fire in the Wash D.C. Holocaust Museum this morning and killed an innocent guard (leaving children). Other guards opened fire. The 88 yr old was shot. He survived. I blame the DC paramedics. I want to say 2 things to the DC medics. 1. WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? and 2. This was your opportunity to really make a difference! WTF!!!! And to the other guards....go to target practice.

The plaintiff received a memo from the hospital explaining the reason for the suspension was the hospital’s concern that her Facebook comment reflected a "deliberate disregard for patient safety." In response, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). After reviewing the evidence, the NLRB found that the hospital did not violate the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB also found that there was no privacy violation because the post was sent, unsolicited, to hospital management.  The plaintiff subsequently filed suit in federal court, alleging the hospital violated her rights under the SCA.

In its ruling, the District Court held that that non-public Facebook wall posts are covered by the SCA, because: (1) Facebook wall posts are electronic communication, (2) they are transmitted via an electronic communication service, the Facebook wall posts are in electronic storage, and (4) Facebook wall posts that are configured to be private are, by definition, not accessible to the general public, and that the touchstone of the SCA is that it protects private information.

However, the District Court ruled that the hospital was not liable because one of the SCA’s exceptions applied, which exempted conduct authorized (1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service; [or] (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user." 18 U.S.C. §2701(c).

The Court held that exception applied because the plaintiff had authorized the paramedic to have access to her Facebook wall by making him a “friend” and that the information the paramedic supplied to hospital management was completely unsolicited.

The District Court implicitly held that if the hospital had directed the paramedic or any other of the plaintiff’s Facebook friends to monitor and keep them appraised on Plaintiff’s Facebook activity, it would have constituted a violation of the SCA due to the hospital seeking unauthorized access.  The SCA provides for civil liability under the statute and an employer would be subject to monetary damages.

While it may be tempting for employers to utilize the Internet to monitor employees’ conduct, the lesson from this case is that employers should never request that co-workers or any other individuals access an employee’s private social media.  As related in previous articles, employers also need to be aware that overly broad social media policies could expose them to potential liability under the National Labor Relations Act.

Mark Fijman is a labor and employment attorney with Phelps Dunbar, LLP, which has offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Alabama, North Carolina and London. To view his firm bio, click here.  He can be reached at (601) 360-9716 and by e-mail at fijmanm@phelps.com.